| ; RUN: llc -mtriple aarch64--none-eabi -mattr=+bti < %s | FileCheck %s |
| ; RUN: llc -mtriple aarch64--none-eabi -global-isel -global-isel-abort=2 -pass-remarks-missed=gisel* -mattr=+bti %s -verify-machineinstrs -o - 2>&1 | FileCheck %s --check-prefixes=CHECK,FALLBACK |
| |
| ; FALLBACK: remark: <unknown>:0:0: unable to translate instruction: call: ' tail call void %p()' (in function: bti_enabled) |
| |
| target datalayout = "e-m:e-i8:8:32-i16:16:32-i64:64-i128:128-n32:64-S128" |
| target triple = "aarch64-arm-none-eabi" |
| |
| ; When BTI is enabled, all indirect tail-calls must use x16 or x17 (the intra |
| ; procedure call scratch registers) to hold the address, as these instructions |
| ; are allowed to target the "BTI c" instruction at the start of the target |
| ; function. The alternative to this would be to start functions with "BTI jc", |
| ; which increases the number of potential ways they could be called, and |
| ; weakens the security protections. |
| |
| define void @bti_disabled(void ()* %p) { |
| entry: |
| tail call void %p() |
| ; CHECK: br x0 |
| ret void |
| } |
| |
| define void @bti_enabled(void ()* %p) "branch-target-enforcement"="true" { |
| entry: |
| tail call void %p() |
| ; CHECK: br {{x16|x17}} |
| ret void |
| } |